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Egypt’s history has witnessed notable 
strides in connection with women’s rights. 
Meanwhile, Egypt is a signatory of the 
significant international conventions on 
gender equality. Nevertheless, interfer-
ence to change women’s position is faced 
with colossal failure sometimes. One of 
the reasons could be the lack of relevant 
legislation. Other essential obstacles 
include social practices and stereotypes 
that prevent the application of the rule of 
law. The absence of community support 
is the third reason. Finally, misconceiving 
Islamic religious rules impacts women’s 
rights in Egypt. Solutions include legal 
reform and complementary policy 
actions; allowing real political participa-
tion; opening the door for women initia-
tives; teaching gender in schools and uni-
versities; and ensuring better access to 
resources when it comes to economic 
rights is another possibility. 
Keywords: Egyptian Women, Women’s 
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Women in Law, Gender and Law
Introduction 
Debates about gender equality are not 
new to Egypt. Egypt ranks lower in gender 
equity than many other countries world-
wide. Most scholarly work analyzing gen-
der equality and the law, as well as wom-
en’s rights in Egyptian laws, focuses on the 
lack of legislation or on flawed laws. Lack 
of academic work on women’s rights is an 
essential barrier to women’s rights in 
Egypt. Nevertheless, other factors are 
equally important in promoting gender 
equality in Egypt. This paper includes a 
more profound argument on gender-re-
lated dynamics and constraints than focus-
ing on the demand to issue new laws or to 
amend current legislation to protect 
Egyptian women’s rights. 
The paper presents four different case 
studies of causes that negatively affect 
gender equality in Egypt and impede the 
feminism movement. The first case study 
explains how social norms and societal 
practices are more potent than laws and 
regulations to the extent that they hinder 
the rule of law and prevent the application 
of the relevant laws, regulations, and leg-
islative policies. The second case study 
discusses how a lack of community sup-
port renders the existing legal framework 
ineffective or at least undermines its effi-
ciency. The main difference between the 
two cases is that, in the first case, social 
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norms that are equal to or even more 
powerful than existing laws prevent the 
latter’s application. However, in the sec-
ond case, there are no social norms that 
prevent the implementation of the law; 
instead, it is the community that feels bur-
dened by the laws and accordingly 
decides to ignore them. 
The third case study analyzes how differ-
ent ways of understanding religions could 
affect the issuance of relevant laws and 
regulations, which in turn undermines the 
efficacy of such legislation. In this case, we 
have laws and regulations that are issued 
based on religious rules. Still, these laws 
imply a misconception, rather than a vio-
lation of religious rules. The last case study 
explains the relationship between the 
absence of a legal framework and gender 
inequality in an attempt to confirm that 
legislative gaps and flawed legislation are 
still elements that affect women’s rights in 
Egypt, but not the only elements. 
Social Norms and Challenges to the Rule 
of Law 
According to Mahmoud Elsaman 
(“Between Rule of Law and Social Norms” 
12-13), existing social norms are some-
times strong enough to prevent the appli-
cation of laws, regulations, the proper 
functioning of the rule of law. An excellent 
example given by Elsaman is the declin-
ing appointment of women to Egypt 
courts. However, the new Egyptian 
Constitution, following a revolution, has 
for the first time expressly provided for 
women’s right to work as judges in Egypt 
based on the concept of gender main-
streaming (Elsaman, “Between Rule of 
Law and Social Norms” 12-13).
Elsaman’s argument seems very sound, 
since the 2014 Constitution is the first legal 
document in Egypt that provides explicitly 
and without any qualifications for gender 
equality between men and women (The 
Constitutional Declaration of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt 4). That contrasts with 
the previous constitutions that used gen-
eral terms to express gender equality such 
as “citizens are equal before the law”; “the 
state shall provide equality”; or “no dis-
crimination shall take place based on sex” 
(The Constitution of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt 40). Most importantly, the new 
Constitution is very detailed, mentioning 
the various aspects of equality in terms of 
nationality, work opportunities, civil rights, 
political rights, economic rights, social 
rights, and cultural rights. The text of the 
new Constitution extends further to con-
firm women’s rights to join the Egyptian 
judiciary. It seems that the intention 
behind such writing is to reflect the revo-
lutionary spirit of the January 25 uprisings 
and turn it into constitutionally mandated 
liberties. Thus, gender equality and wom-
en’s rights in the new Constitution comply 
with the modern liberal vision of the new 
state (McLarney, “Women’s Rights in the 
Egyptian Constitution: (Neo) Liberalism’s 
Family Values”).
The historical legal incident that first trig-
gered the debate over the right of women 
to be appointed to Egypt courts is Aisha 
Rateb’s case. This lawyer applied for the 
position of judge in the administrative 
court system represented in the State 
Council of Egypt in 1949 (Messieh and 
Gaber, “A Win for Women in Egypt’s 
Courts”). The Supreme Administrative 
Court declined Aisha Rateb’s application 
based on her gender. Sixty-two years after 
Rateb’s case, Omnia Taher, a young lawyer, 
filed a lawsuit claiming her right to join the 
State Council as a judge. The suit has not 
been decided yet; however, the Unit of 
the Commissioners of the State Council 
submitted their report in January 2017, 
advising the court to dismiss the case. It is 
worth noting here that Rateb’s Judicial 
Decision of 1953 was issued in the light of 
a constitution that generally provides for 
gender equality between men and women 
without expressly providing for women’s 
right to hold public posts. In contrast, the 
judicial reaction to Taher’s suit repre-
sented in the Commissioners’ report of 
2017, is issued in light of the 2014 
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Constitution, which not only provides for 
gender equality, but also specifically for 
women’s right to hold judicial posts. 
Accordingly, the Commissioners’ report of 
2017 is inconsistent with the rule of law 
and conflicts with a constitutional rule 
(Elsaman, “Between Rule of Law and Social 
Norms” 12-13).
Here comes Elsaman’s core argument is 
that the existence of defective social 
norms adversely affects development and 
contradicts the application of the rule of 
law. According to Elsaman, social norms 
are informal rules that individuals feel 
obliged to follow either because they 
have an inner feeling of duty towards 
them or because they want to avoid the 
social sanctions that result from the norm 
(Brennan and Anoma, “Social Norms, the 
Invisible Hand, and the Law” 2). The pre-
vailing social norms that prevent women 
from being judges in Egypt include the 
difficulty of administrative work, the lack of 
workplace stability, the oppressive social 
commitments of women, and the conser-
vative nature of Egyptian society. Some 
argue that administrative work is difficult 
for women to handle, mainly because it 
requires women to spend long hours 
away from their homes and children. Also, 
judges are usually required to relocate to 
prevent them from establishing social 
relationships with litigants and petitioners, 
to guarantee impartiality. It is socially hard 
for women in Egypt to leave their families 
and relocate (El Sayed 135). Further, it is 
argued that women cannot handle admin-
istrative work, e.g., prosecutors’ duties 
related to sexual crimes. Mainly, Egyptian 
women are conservative and sensitive to 
some sorts of cases that entail sexual con-
tent, such as cases of rape or sexual 
harassment (Elsaman, “Between Rule of 
Law and Social Norms” 12-13). Generally, 
most opinions conclude that women are 
excluded from the judiciary due to the 
nature of Egyptian society. They state that 
the community itself is not ready to accept 
female judges.
Elsaman concludes that the existence of 
defective social norms deprives society of 
various chances for development. It might 
also undermine respect for the rule of law. 
The Egyptian case of denying women’s 
right to work as judges deprives Egyptian 
society of women’s contribution to 
enhancing the judiciary. Moreover, defec-
tive social norms in Egypt have violated 
the rule of law by breaching the relevant 
constitutional principles. 
Another example of how social norms 
impair the rule of law and prevent the 
implementation of gender equality as 
established in the 2014 Constitution is 
political rights. Article 11 provides that: 
The State shall ensure the achieve-
ment of equality between women and 
men in all civil, political […] rights in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. The State shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure the ap-
propriate representation of women in 
the houses of representatives, as spe-
cified by Law. The State shall also gua-
rantee women’s right of holding public 
and senior management offices in the 
State. (The Constitution of the Arab Re-
public of Egypt 4)
According to the OECD, over the past 20 
years, the level of women’s representation 
in the Parliament has remained either 
under 3% (following the elections in 1995, 
2000, 2005, and 2012) or at 13% and 15% 
(following the votes in 2010 and 2015). For 
the first time, a quota system was instated 
for the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary elec-
tions. Currently, women hold 15% of the 
parliamentary seats, the highest propor-
tion of women ever to serve in Egypt’s par-
liament. Nevertheless, while these 
improvements are encouraging, the per-
centage of female elected parliamentari-
ans in Egypt remains low compared with 
the majority of countries in the Middle 
East. Meanwhile, 15% female representa-
tion in the Parliament is a meager ratio 
compared with 85% of male representa-
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tion (OECD “Women’s Political 
Participation in Egypt”)
Egyptian society has been influenced by 
resilient cultural arguments that discour-
age women from participating in public 
life. Egyptian women’s participation in 
public life is dealt with as a challenge to 
traditional social roles for women, which 
establish that leaving political work in the 
hands of men achieves better results for 
society. Socially, women are said to lack 
the ability to make effective political alli-
ances. Social norms, for example, are 
reported to have dictated that public 
events in villages and governorates are 
appropriate for male politicians to cam-
paign at, but not for women. The same 
applies to mosques, which reduces wom-
en’s opportunities to convince citizens to 
vote for them (OECD “Women’s Political 
Participation in Egypt”). Another blatant 
example of the breach of the rule of law 
based on social norms is legislation that 
contains clauses contrary to what has 
been established in the Constitution. 
Sometimes the constitutional guarantees 
have been undermined with limiting 
clauses such as “to be regulated by law.” 
(El-Ashry and Arafa, “Gender Equality in 
the Arab and Muslim World”) In this case, 
constitutional guarantees have little effect 
in practice where legislation continues to 
contain gender inequality (El-Ashry and 
Arafa, “Gender Equality in the Arab and 
Muslim World”).
This argument sounds correct in that hav-
ing such generic terms can undermine the 
efficacy of gender equality as a constitu-
tional principle. Nevertheless, in the case 
of the new Egyptian Constitution, none of 
these terms were used to confirm gender 
equality. Thus, while the Constitution 
makes it clear that 
The State shall ensure the achievement 
of equality between women and men 
in all civil [...] social [...] rights following 
the provisions of this Constitution (The 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt 4), 
the Egyptian Penal Code discriminates 
against women. The penalty for commit-
ting adultery goes up to two years for 
women, which is severer than for men, 
whose punishment is limited to a six-
month sentence. Evidentiary standards 
also differ in that a man must commit adul-
tery at the marital house, while women’s 
act is punishable wherever it occurs (Law 
Promulgating the Penal Code, 274 and 
277). The reason behind such discrimina-
tion in penalty is that the negative psycho-
logical effect of the incident on men is 
considered more severe than on women. 
It is worth noting here that this distinction 
has no basis in Shari’a law.
Dumping Family Responsibilities and Lack 
of Community Support 
According to the new Egyptian 
Constitution, the State is committed to 
achieving employment equality among all 
citizens. The Constitution also provides that 
the State shall ensure the achievement 
of equality between women and men 
in all […] economic […] rights. The Sta-
te shall […] ensure enabling women 
to strike a balance between family du-
ties and work requirements (The 2014 
Egyptian Constitution 4).
In the same context, the Egyptian Labor 
and Employment Law has a set of specific 
rules on the employment of women to 
enable women to carry out their duties to 
their families and children without suffer-
ing prejudice or deprivation of rights at 
work (Law No. 12 of 2003 on Labor Law). 
For instance, it prohibits discrimination in 
employment opportunities, work condi-
tions, and salaries. 
Moreover, it grants women some special 
privileges related to their physical nature, 
such as paid maternity leave, childcare, 
breastfeeding hours, and protection 
against dismissal during these times. 
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Other benefits include granting women 
the choice to terminate an employment 
contract for marriage, pregnancy, or 
maternity. The only limited legal restriction 
on jobs for women is related to those jobs 
that do not fit their nature, such as mining, 
working with asphalt, loading, and unload-
ing (Law No. 12 of 2003 on Labor Law).
The above legal framework should have 
ensured at least an employment rate close 
to that of men; however, according to 
Amal Khairy, women are actively discrimi-
nated against, with only 26% of them in 
the labor force (Khaiy and Mohamed “An 
Analysis of the Gender Pay Gap”). 
Moreover, statistics show inequality in pay-
ment by gender, particularly in the private 
sector (Khaiy and Mohamed “An Analysis 
of the Gender Pay Gap”). Also, favorable 
working rights granted to women by the 
Employment Law sometimes result in dis-
crimination against them. Thus, employ-
ers are overloaded with obligations 
towards women employees, which leads 
them to prefer a male workforce. The var-
ious types of work leaves, requiring 
employers to establish nurseries once 
the number of female employees reaches 
a certain percentage, and the require-
ment to implement security measures if 
women work at night and others are 
examples. Furthermore, a rough working 
environment for married women in par-
ticular leads them to prefer public sector 
jobs, thinking that they are less chal-
lenged by the lower workload (El-Ashry 
and Arafa, “Gender Equality in the Arab 
and Muslim World”).
Lack of community support need not 
impair the application of the rule of law. 
Also, it does not reflect legislative gaps, 
and a comprehensive legal framework 
exists. However, women’s rights are still 
negatively affected by the lack of support 
and of facilities provided by the commu-
nity. Also, family burdens and societal 
overwhelming of women with more obli-
gations and requirements stand between 
women and gender equality.  
Misconceiving Islamic (Shari’a) Law 
Article 3 of the Constitution provides that 
The principles of the laws of Egyptian 
Christians and Jews are the main sour-
ce of laws regulating their status, reli-
gious affairs, and selection of spiritual 
leaders (The New Egyptian Constituti-
on 3). 
This provision has always existed in 
Egyptian constitutions throughout Egypt’s 
modern history. The basis of family law in 
Egypt has always been Muslim law or 
Shari’a Law, as the majority of Egyptians 
are Muslims. Minorities (which make up 
less than 10% of the population) such as 
Christians are subject to their own rules 
(El-Kharboutly and Hussein, “Law and the 
Status of Women in the Arab Republic of 
Egypt” 35). The strong effect of Shari’a Law 
becomes evident in the general reserva-
tions Egypt made to the CEDAW agree-
ment that “Egypt is willing to comply with 
this Article provided that such compliance 
does not run counter to Islamic Shari’a 
law.” (CEDAW). Reservations apply to 
Article 2 on Policy Measures, Article 16 on 
Equality in Marriage and Family Life, and 
Article 29 (2) on Administration Of The 
Convention And Arbitration Of Disputes 
(CEDAW).
Having said this, the critical question in 
connection with family issues is how 
Shari’a Law is interpreted and conceived, 
since it is the primary source of family law 
rather than the family law rules them-
selves. Another, related question is who 
interprets Shari’a Law. The expression 
Shari’a Law means, first, the rules derived 
from the primary sources of Islamic law 
19/06/20 14:20, namely the Holy Book of 
Qur’an (Glossary of Islamic Legal Terms 
99), which Allah dictated word for word 
to his Prophet Muhammad (PB). The sec-
ond source is Sunna (Glossary of Islamic 
Legal Terms 90), which means the prac-
tice of Prophet Muhammad (PB), taking 
the form of actions, oral statements, or 
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consensus in an attempt to explain 
Qur’an. Then come another two supple-
mentary sources called secondary 
sources (Bassiouni and Badr 138-140) that 
include the Ijma’ and the Qiyas (Glossary 
of Islamic Legal Terms 99). Qur’an is the 
primary source of Shari’a Law, working as 
the legal code and a reference for 
Muslims’ behavior. The Qur’an is the 
highest source of the Shari’a Law, with 
rules that are not arguable and cannot be 
modified by rules derived from any other 
sources (Bassiouni and Badr 138-140).
Through the Sunna (Glossary of Islamic 
Legal Terms 99), Prophet Muhammad (PB) 
interpreted, explained, and completed 
the principles revealed in the Qur’an. 
Hence, the Sunna cannot contradict the 
Qur’an; otherwise, it is not a trusted Sunna 
and should not be considered. Where the 
Qur’an and the Sunna do not guide on 
specific issues, the supplementary sources 
of Ijma’ and Qiyas apply. Ijma’ is estab-
lished through the unanimous opinions of 
the professional and knowledgeable 
Muslim jurists of each era. In the end, any 
conclusion reached through Ijma’ must 
conform with the primary sources of the 
Shari’a, the Qur’an and the Sunna. Qiyas is 
a method of analogical reasoning that 
aims to govern a new situation with an old 
rule as long as this latest situation is similar 
to that dictated by the old law. Qiyas 
derives its reliability as a source of the 
Shari’a from the Qur’an and the Sunna 
(Bassiouni and Badr 138-140).
Based on the above, it seems that Shari’a 
law is not inflexible dogma. Also, changes 
in society necessitate an adaptation of law 
to time and circumstance. However, many 
factors affect the interpretation of Shari’a 
law and, accordingly, women’s rights and 
gender equality in the Muslim world. 
Outdated beliefs and traditions, state pol-
icies, the absence of female Muslim jurists 
(particularly in the committees established 
to interpret Shari’a law), and the low rate 
of education led to misconceptions of 
Islamic practices and accordingly to dis-
criminatory norms against women that are 
claimed to be based on Shari’a law. 
A good example is the interpretation of 
the Qur’anic verse on polygamy. The verse 
reads,
And if you fear that ye shall not be able 
to deal justly with the orphans, marry 
women of your choice, two, or three, 
or four; but if you fear that ye shall not 
be able to deal justly, then only one… 
(Yusuf Ali Sura 4, Verse 3).
 A radical interpretation of the verse allows 
Muslim men to marry more than one wife. 
Mohamed Abdou, a leading 19th-century 
Egyptian theologian and reformer, notes 
that the welfare of the society is superior 
to the satisfaction of the sensual desire of 
individuals, and that the stipulations on 
polygamy are particularly challenging to 
meet (Amira, “Islamic Law and Gender 
Equality” 27).
Amira Mashhour’s reading of the Qur’anic 
verse on polygamy, together with the his-
torical context, leads to the conclusion 
that Islam discourages polygamy. 
Mashhour correctly argues, 
The verse was revealed after the mur-
derous battle in which there was a lar-
ge number of male Muslim casualties, 
thus increasing the number of widows 
and orphans for whom protection was 
required. That is why this verse was in-
troduced to protect the widows and 
children of martyrs. Hence, allowing 
the survivors to take additional wives 
was a way of providing the widows and 
orphans with some physical and finan-
cial protection (Amira, “Islamic Law and 
Gender Equality” 27).
The Egyptian Family Law was developed 
to amend the conditions of polygamy 
over time by requiring husbands to con-
fess any existing marriage and to officially 
notify the first wife of the new marriage. 
Also, the wife’s right to ask for a divorce if 
her husband takes a second wife is recog-
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nized (Law No. 100 of 1985 Amending No. 
25/1929). Meanwhile, other jurisdictions, 
such as Tunisia, prohibit polygamy, though 
Tunisia is a Muslim country. 
Another example is divorce rules. 
According to Shari’a Law, divorce is a 
man’s right, provided he follows the rele-
vant restrictions and limitations of the 
Shari’a. The details of divorce are outside 
the scope of this article. In return, women 
have a similar right, which is Khul. Khul 
means leaving part of a woman’s dowry to 
her husband to get a divorce. Khul is an 
absolute individual right for women. 
Though this is the situation in Shari’a law, 
Egypt’s family law was unjust to women in 
the area of divorce for ages. To seek a 
divorce, women had to go through a long 
process of showing evidence of harm 
caused by their husbands and other ele-
ments. In 2000, a new law was issued to 
allow women to seek a divorce in the form 
of Khul (Law No. 100 of 1985 Amending 
No. 25/1929).
A third example is inheritance law. Two 
types of rules govern inheritance in Shari’a 
Law. Ashab Al-Frood are ten defined per-
sons, six of whom can be women entitled 
to a  defined share  of the estate. Al-’Asabat, 
are those entitled to the balance of the 
estate after distributing the shares of the 
Ashab Al-Frood. In Al-’Asabat, when a man 
and a woman have the same level (such as 
a brother and sister), the woman is entitled 
to half as much as the man. The rationale 
is to assign a financial responsibility to the 
man to provide household expenses after 
the father’s death, to give sisters the 
expenses for marriage, and to provide for 
his own family as head of the household.
In contrast, his sister will be provided for 
by her husband. Egyptian inheritance law 
codifies only the first part of the rule, which 
is giving a sister half her brother’s share, 
without the second part, assigning the 
brother the financial responsibilities 
explained by Shari’a Law (El-Ahsry and 
Arafa, “Gender Equality in the Arab and 
Muslim World” 3). Some countries, such as 
Tunisia, try to avoid Shari’a Law inheritance 
rules, claiming that it is unfair. However, 
the reality is that Shari’a Law inheritance 
rules are not adopted in the right context, 
as explained. 
To sum up, the misconception of Islamic 
Shari’a Law has contributed to a long-pre-
vailing misunderstanding. Most impor-
tantly, laws are issued based on this mis-
understanding or radical perception of 
Shari’a Law, which should be reconsid-
ered. 
The Absence of Organizational Legislation 
and Flawed Legislation 
Though the Egyptian Constitution pro-
vides, “…[T]he State shall protect women 
against all forms of violence…” (The New 
Egyptian Constitution 11), no laws have 
been issued or amended to combat 
domestic violence against women; some-
times a relevant law is promulgated, but it 
is so poorly drafted that it cannot effica-
ciously detect abuse, as in the case of 
female genital mutilation (FGM). 
According to the OECD, domestic vio-
lence, particularly by partners and family 
members, is considered permissible 
because of the relationship of the woman 
to the perpetrator. A 2015 study found that 
almost half of the women aged 18 to 64 
and ever married reported spousal vio-
lence (OECD). 70% of domestic violence 
crimes against women are perpetrated 
against wives, rather than daughters and 
mothers. Few countries in the Middle East 
area, particularly North Africa, have laws 
against such violence. Another example is 
marital rape. No provision in Egyptian law 
prohibits marital rape. 
On the other hand, the Egyptian Penal 
Code has been amended recently to crim-
inalize FGM. Also, in 2012, the Egyptian 
Supreme Constitutional Court recognized 
FGM as an infringement of the physical 
integrity of a human being. Nevertheless, 
statistics show that 9 out of 10 women in 
Egypt aged between 18 and 64 were vic-
tims of FGM. The percentage increases in 
Upper Egypt and the rural areas. The 
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question here is why FGM is spreading in 
Egypt while it is illegal. The answer is 
found in the poor drafting of the criminal-
izing law. 
To explain, Article 242 of the Egyptian 
Penal Code defines FGM as acts of female 
genital mutilation, by removing any of the 
external female genital organs, whether in 
part or whole or by inflicting any injuries 
to these organs without medical justifica-
tion (Law Promulgating the Penal Code 
242). 
Adding this limiting clause without medi-
cal justification renders the provision 
devoid of meaning, or at least undermines 
its value by opening the door to bending 
the rules. Most importantly, the law does 
not define what constitutes medical justi-
fication. Moreover, Article 242 (a) criminal-
ized requesting FGM, but did not mention 
aiding or abetting the practice (Law 
Promulgating the Penal Code 242).
These examples show that lack of laws or 
having a defective law remains one of the 
main reasons behind the inability to pro-
vide the proper legal protection for wom-
en’s rights.
Any Way Out? 
As we see from the above four case stud-
ies, many factors affect having a safe, legal 
environment for women in Egypt. The 
absence of law is a crucial one, as evi-
denced in case four. Other factors, too, 
affect the rule of law and prevent the 
application of laws. In case one, social 
norms are more effective than legislation 
to the extent that they hamper the imple-
mentation of the rule of law. Case two 
shows that lack of support from the com-
munity can lead to gender inequality 
despite good legislation. Finally, in case 
three, the misconception of Shari’a Law, as 
well as some other external factors, might 
lead to gender inequality in the laws and 
regulations based on Shari’a Law. Here is 
another essential argument of this paper. 
Gender equality and protection of wom-
en’s rights in Egypt cannot be achieved by 
merely amending a law or adding a few 
provisions that restate the right of women 
to practice their rights freely without dis-
crimination. Other measures must be 
adopted to overcome these obstacles. 
Enabling real political participation and 
opening the door for women’s organiza-
tions and initiatives is an efficacious pos-
sibility. Elsadda correctly argues that any 
politically motivated gender equality laws 
arising out of s corrupt agenda rather 
years of work on a women’s rights regime 
do not lead to real achievements (Elsadda, 
“Women’s Right Activism” 84-93). Elsadda 
gives an excellent example in the estab-
lishment of the Egyptian National Council 
for Women under Mubarak and his ex-first 
lady, who appeared as the champion of 
women’s rights. Thus, instead of support-
ing the women’s rights movement, the 
Egyptian National Council for Women 
competed with existing women’s organi-
zations and tried to monopolize speaking 
on behalf of all Egyptian women. The 
result is that most of the legislative reform 
that has taken place in this era led to 
immense social problems on the ground, 
rather satisfying the demands for wom-
en’s rights (Elsadda, “Women’s Right 
Activism” 84-93). 
Teaching about gender at schools and 
universities could be an important step. 
Thus, the radical traditions and wrong 
societal practice and misunderstanding of 
women’s rights are a strong obstacle 
embracing new attitudes in practice. This 
underscores the importance of gender 
education, particularly in rural areas. 
Similarly, ensuring better access to eco-
nomic resources and employment oppor-
tunities is another possibility.
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